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I. Introduction 
Previous empirical work shows that workers who use informal contacts to find 
employment have longer job tenure.   The rationale typically given is that such contacts 
reduce uncertainty about the quality of the match between worker and employer.  Related 
research finding higher wages for many workers who use informal contacts supports this 
explanation.   
This paper contends that there is an alternative explanation of the positive 
relationship between using informal contacts and job tenure for some young men.  Lower 
wages, wage growth, and expected job tenure may characterize those using contacts with 
little clout in the market.  In such cases, the correlation between informal contacts and job 
tenure should not be interpreted as evidence of better match quality.  Workers with poor 
quality personal contacts may rely on informal information sources only as a last resort 
when they are unable to find lucrative jobs through other means.  Such workers would 
remain at their current jobs mainly because they have limited alternative choices rather 
than because of better match quality.     
 
II.  Previous Literature and Theoretical Model 
The job shopping approach (Johnson, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979; and Viscusi, 1980) 
posits that prospective workers are heterogeneous in preferences and abilities and jobs are 
heterogeneous in the skills required and in their non-pecuniary characteristics.  Since 
many job characteristics cannot be easily ascertained without actual employment 
experience, some hired workers may be poor matches for jobs they hold.  Greater   2
uncertainty about worker and employer characteristics raises the chance that the match 
between worker and firm will turn out worse than it initially appears. 
Simon and Warner (1992) hypothesize that informal contacts reduce the 
frequency of overestimating match quality and, therefore, also lower the turnover rate.   
Using a sample of scientists and engineers, Simon and Warner found that jobs obtained 
through contacts made by recruiters or by acquaintances inside the firm lasted 
significantly longer than jobs obtained through want ads or private agencies.  Similarly, 
Datcher (1983) showed that, for African-Americans and for college workers, knowing 
someone at the firm reduced the quit rate.  Positive correlations between informal 
contacts and wages found by Simon and Warner (1992), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002), 
and Rosenbaum et al (1991) are consistent with this job matching story.   
In contrast, Topel and Ward (1992) argue that the average young worker holds 
seven jobs in the first ten years of his working life and that job mobility accounts for one-
third of wage growth during this period.  This suggests that low turnover is not always 
desirable.  Remaining on the same job may reduce wages and wage growth if the reason 
for longer tenure is limited access to alternative jobs.  
Following Topel and Ward, this paper models job mobility decisions as 
comparisons between external and internal wage offers.  The probability distribution of  
new internal wage offers (wI) from the current employer depends on job tenure (T) and 
individual productivity characteristics (X) and is given by: 
(1) Prob  (wI < y; w, X, T) = F(y; w, X, T)
 1T. 
Workers can receive external offers from low wage and high wage sources.  The 
cumulative distribution of offers from these sources are L(w,X) and H(w,X) respectively.    3
The external wage offer (wE) distribution depends on α, the fraction of offers obtained 
through high offer sources and is given by:
(2) Prob  (wE < z; X, α) = αH(w,X) +(1-α)L(w,X).  
It is assumed that both H(w,X) and F(w,X,T) stochastically dominate L(w,X).  Workers 
rely on low-wage external offer sources only as a last resort when realizations from other 
possibilities are especially low. 
The expected present discounted value of lifetime wealth from searching 
optimally on a job that currently pays wage w can be written as V(w,X,T,α).   Workers 
will leave their current job if  wE>R(w,X,T, α)  where R(w,X,T, α) is the reservation 
wage offer satisfying  V(w,X,T, α)=V(R(w,X,T, α),X,0, α).  If π is the probability of 
receiving a new job offer, the likelihood of leaving a job at tenure T is then   
(3)  λ(w, X, T, α) = π prob[wE> R(w, X, T, α)] 
                                                = π[1 – [αH(w,X) +(1-α)L(w,X)]]. 
Equation (3) shows that the correlation between whether the individual used 
informal contacts to find his current job and the rate of subsequent turnover is ambiguous 
for two reasons.  The first reason is that workers who found their current jobs through 
contacts with access to high wages offers have both higher wE and higher R(w,X,T,α).    
Since access to high wage offers increases the wages on current job, it raises reservation 
wages (R(w,X,T,α) assuming RW>0) and, therefore, reduces the likelihood of turnover.  
On the other hand, since access to high wage offers improves the distribution of external 
wage offers [αH(w,X) +(1-α)L(w,X)], alternatives to the current job are more attractive 
(wE) and, therefore, turnover is higher.  For relatively low values of π, the former is likely   4
to dominate.  The gains associated with a better distribution of wage offers are small if 
few offers are actually made. 
There are several examples of research indicating that better network quality both 
improves reservation wages and/or wages on the current job.  Mortensen and Vishwanath 
(1994) argue that the current wage for those using job contacts is generated by access to 
better distribution of wage offers than that available to those without contacts.  Because 
employed workers only move from lower to higher paying jobs, wages earned by 
contacts and, therefore, the distribution of wages available through contacts dominates 
the distribution of wage offers available to all job seekers.  As indicated earlier, Simon 
and Warner (1992) posit that the quality of the match between workers and firms is 
uncertain.  This means that part of the return to accepting an initial wage offer is the 
prospect of higher than expected productivity.  Contacts reduce the uncertainty and, 
therefore, increase workers’ reservation wages.  Montgomery (1991) argues that job 
seekers differ in network density (the number of social ties with job holders) and in the 
correlation of productive traits between acquaintances (inbreeding bias).  He shows that 
the greater is the degree of inbreeding bias and the network density the greater is the 
competition among firms for referred workers and the higher are their wages relative to 
others.  All these examples point to higher wages on the current job and, therefore, higher 
subsequent reservation wages and lower turnover for those with good quality contacts.  
Similar arguments could be made for non-wage compensation or non-pecuniary job 
amenities (Viscusi, 1980).   
The second reason why the effects of job contacts on turnover is ambiguous is 
that not all personal contacts belong to the high wage offer category.  In contrast to work   5
previously mentioned, some analysts found no general initial or persistent wage effects 
(Bridges and Willemez, 1986; Holzer, 1987; Marsden and Hulbert, 1988; Elliott, 2000) 
for jobs gained through personal contacts.  Other studies (Elliott, 1999; and Green, 
Tigges, and Diaz, 1999) showed that those using contacts earned less than those using 
formal methods.  Loury (2003) concluded that differences in contact characteristics may 
account for these divergent findings.  She estimated insignificant or negative effects for 
most types of contacts on young workers and significant positive effects only for older 
male contacts.  
Workers may accept jobs from low wage offer contacts because their α, the 
fraction of offers obtained through high wage offer sources, is low. Without much access 
to H(w,X), workers with low past realizations of wI may be forced to choose jobs from 
the L(w,X) distribution.  They subsequently remain in these jobs again because α is low.  
They may want to move to other jobs but do not have contacts that can provide such 
offers. 
Related work by Keith and McWilliams (1995) and Abbott and Beach (1994) 
shows that the effects of job mobility on wages depend on the source of the job change.  
Involuntary mobility in the form of family-related quits, layoffs, and discharges reduced 
wages.  Voluntary quits increased wages.  This implies that those without access to job 
offers that make voluntary quits attractive would remain on the job and have longer 
tenure. 
Longer tenure is not uniformly desirable according these two different 
explanations of the correlation between contacts and job tenure.  The correlation for those 
with high wage offer contacts comes from higher compensation and improved matches   6
between workers and firms.   On the other hand, the correlation for those with low wage 
offer contacts comes from limited alternatives to the current job. 
 
III.  Data and Empirical Results 
The data used in this paper comes from the male sample of the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).   The NLSY is nationally representative panel of 
12,686 individuals ages 14-21 in 1979 who were interviewed annually to determine a 
wide variety of information about schooling, work, and other experiences. This paper 
estimates the effect of different types of informal contacts on how long between 1982 and 
1992 workers remained on their 1982 job.  It also examines the effects of contacts on 
wage growth from 1982 to 1987 and on other indicators of the desirability of the 1982 
job.  The focus is on young workers (ages 17 to 24 as of 1982) since job mobility is most 
closely associated with wage growth among younger workers
2.   
Informal contact variables for the job held in 1982 were based on responses to the 
questions (1) Was there anyone specifically who helped you get a job with your most 
recent employer, (2) Was this person male or female, (3) Was this person a relative, and 
(4) If yes, what was the person’s relationship to you.   
Means and standard deviations of job tenure and of the contact variables used in 
the analysis are listed in Table 1.  Job turnover among these young workers is substantial.  
About 23 percent of workers left their 1982 jobs before 1983, 52 percent had left before 
1984, 75 percent by end of 1986, and 84 percent by the end of 1992
3.  Slightly over half 
of the sample (54.4 percent) found their 1982 jobs through friends and relatives.  Brothers 
(including in-laws), male cousins, and male friends accounted for much of this fraction   7
(33.3 percent).   Prior-generation male relatives (fathers, stepfathers, uncles, and fathers-
in-law) and all female relatives and friends accounted for about 10 percent each.   
Table 2 presents the results of using Cox proportional hazard model to estimate 
the effects of these contact variables on job tenure.  The hazard specification is given by 
h(t|Xj )=h(t0 )exp(Xj  β) where Xj is a vector of individual characteristics, h(t0 ) is the 
baseline hazard, and, relative to the baseline hazard, h(t|Xj ) is the probability density 
associated with individual j leaving his 1982 job at time t given that he has tenure of at 
least t
4.      
Table 2 shows that years of schooling, work experience as of 1982, and 1982 
union membership are all negatively correlated with subsequent turnover
5.  Although 
economic theory indicates that the multivariate nature of these relationships is often 
uncertain (Galizzi and Lang, 1998), these findings conform to most other empirical work 
(see, for example, Farber, 1994; Neal, 1998; Bronars and Famulari, 1997).   
The spline job tenure variables in Table 2 show that the probability of leaving the 
1982 job increases with tenure in the first two years of employment and declines 
thereafter.  Gains from gathering information about the current job may account for the 
initial increase. According to Jovanovic (1979), such an increase is especially likely in 
cases where the amount of prior job information is low.  Farber (1994) also found an 
increasing hazard at the beginning of job tenure using NLSY data.   Turnover eventually 
falls with tenure as the worker gets more specific training or as information is obtained 
about the quality of the match between worker and firm.   
The exponentiated coefficients from Table 2 can be interpreted as the ratio of 
hazards [h(t|Xj )/h(t0 )] for a one-unit change in the covariates. This means that young   8
men who found their 1982 jobs through prior-generation male relatives were about 70 
percent as likely to leave the 1982 job as those who found their job through formal means 
(exp(-0.3538)= 0.702). While help from contemporary generation male relatives and 
friends and all female friends and relatives also reduced turnover, these sources do not 
appear to be as valuable as prior-generation male relatives.   Workers using help from 
these groups were only about 90 percent as likely to leave the 1982 job as those who 
found their job through formal means (exp(-0.0961)=0.908 and exp(-0.1304)=0.878)
6.    
This effect is significantly lower than that for prior-generation male relatives. 
Interpreting the lower turnover rates as evidence of better quality matches may be 
appropriate for previous work which also finds higher wages for those with informal 
contacts (Simon and Warner, 1992).   However, as indicated earlier, wages are not 
uniformly higher for all those using such contacts.  Loury (2003) found 14 percent higher 
wages for those using prior generation male contacts compared to those using formal 
sources.  Wages for those using contemporary generation males were not significantly 
different from formal sources.  Wages for those using female contacts were significantly 
lower than those using formal sources.  The combination of lower turnover without 
higher compensation does not easily fit the job-matching story.  Instead, these workers 
may rely on informal information sources only as a last resort when they are unable to 
find lucrative jobs through other means.   
This hypothesis of limited alternatives cannot be tested directly.  However, two 
findings support this explanation.  The first is that jobs obtained through contemporary 
generation male friends and relatives or through female friends and relatives do not have 
characteristics that would compensate for the absence of higher 1982 wages relative to   9
those taking jobs found through formal means.  In 1982, respondents were asked how 
would they rate their job from 1 to 4 in terms of whether chances for promotion were 
good (1 – not true at all and 4 – very true) and, in 1987, respondents were re-interviewed 
and asked their current wage rate. Table 3 shows that workers who found their jobs 
through contemporary generation male friends and relatives or through female friends 
and relatives rated their promotion possibilities on their 1982 job comparable to those 
who used formal means and significantly lower for than those who found their jobs 
through prior generation male relatives.  Wage growth between 1982 and 1987 was also 
significantly lower for those who found their jobs through these apparently poorer quality 
contacts.  Wage growth is measured for all workers - those who remain on the 1982 job 
and those who switched to alternatives.  It, therefore, captures the overall effect of the 
network quality on future wage opportunities
7.  Those with better networks either receive 
higher wages on their original job or have the opportunity to switch to better paying jobs. 
The second indication that those who rely on female or young male sources have 
limited alternative choices comes from comparing actual and expected job tenure.  In 
1982, NLSY respondents were asked how many years
8 they expected to keep their 
current job. Table 3 shows that the workers using female or young male sources expected 
to be on these jobs for two fewer years than those using older male contacts (the left-out 
group) and about the same length of time as those using formal search procedures.  As 
indicated earlier, Table 2 showed that workers who found their jobs through female and 
young male relatives and friends stayed on the job longer than those who found their job 
through formal channels.  One interpretation of this combination of longer actual tenure 
after 1982 (Table 2) but relatively shorter expected tenure as of 1982 (Table 3) is that   10
these workers may be frustrated in their attempts to find better employment.    Lower 
anticipated chances for promotion fit this interpretation.  In contrast, men who found their 
jobs from prior generation male relatives both expected longer tenure than those using 
formal sources (Table 3) and actually achieved longer tenure (Table 2). 
 
IV. Summary 
The turnover results in this paper support previous work which indicates that 
those who find their jobs through friends and relatives uniformly have longer job tenure 
than those finding jobs through formal means.  It presents additional evidence that the 
reasons for longer job stays differ depending on the characteristics of the contacts.  Those 
who found their jobs through prior generation male relatives have higher current wages, 
higher wage growth, expected to be promoted more frequently, and anticipate longer job 
tenure than those finding jobs through formal or other informal means.  This evidence 
suggests that they remain on the job because of better match quality between worker and 
firm.   
Those who find their jobs through contemporary generation male friends and 
relatives or through female friends and relatives enjoy smaller wage growth and report 
fewer expected chances for promotion.  They have longer job tenure even though they 
anticipated earlier exits from their current jobs.  They, therefore, appear to remain at their 
current jobs mainly because they have limited alternative choices.  
   11
Footnote
 
1 A more complicated model would also include wage growth (Galizzi and Lang, 
1998).      
2 The NLSY has 6403 male observations.  A total of 3168 observations were not 
included in the analysis - 1857 because individuals were still in school, 336 because of 
invalid data for years of schooling in 1982, and 975 because they did not work in 1982 or 
because of invalid data for 1982 wages or 1982 job tenure. 
3 Total tenure ends either when the 1982 job ends or in 1992 (the end of the 
observation period for this paper).  Sixteen percent of the sample was still on the 1982 
job as of the 1992 interview.   
4 Unlike many other estimation choices, the hazard model can accommodate right 
censoring (individuals may still be on the 1982 job at the end of the observation period in 
1992) and left truncation (most individuals in the sample began their 1982 job before 
1982). 
5 The coefficient of AFQT score is also negative as in Neal (1998).  However, it is 
significant only at the 10 percent level. 
6 Adding 1982 wages to the covariates lowers the absolute value of the size of the 
effect for older male relatives and younger male friends and relatives.  The coefficients 
with wages included are –0.342 and –0.092 respectively.  Adding 1982 wages raises the 
absolute value of the size of the effect for female relatives and friends.  The coefficient 
with wages included is -0.141.  The small differences without and with wages suggest 
that the main sources of the informal effects are either non-pecuniary job characteristics 
or anticipated future compensation.   12
 
7 According to Table 1, 75 percent of workers had left their 1982 jobs by 1986.  
Simon and Warner (1992) reported lower rather than higher wage growth for those 
finding their jobs through contacts.  The fact that Simon and Warner (1992) focused on 
wage growth for those remaining the original job may account for the discrepancy.  In 
addition, workers with good contacts may receive more specific training if they are better 
matches for idiosyncratic firm characteristics than are other workers (see Montgomery, 
1992b).  This is more likely to be true for the young men sample used here than for the 
sample of scientists and engineers used by Simon and Warner. 
8 Those who choose less than 1 were coded as 1, 1-2 as 1.5, 3-5 as 4, 6-9 as 7.5, 
10 or more as 12.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Selected Variables 
Contact Variables     
    
Had help to find job with present    
employer from friends and    0.5437 
family, total    (0.4981) 
    
   Father (including in-law and     0.0986
   step), grandfather, or uncle    (0.2982)
      
   Mother (including in-law and     0.0287
   step), grandmother, or aunt    (0.1671)
    
   Sisters, female cousins, or    0.0699
   female friends    (0.2550)
    
   Brothers, male cousins, or     0.3325
   male friends    (0.4712)
    
   Other relatives    0.0139 
   (0.1171) 
    
Turnover on 1982 job     
    
  Left before 1983    0.2275
   (0.4193)
  
  Left before 1984    0.5171
   (0.4998)
  
 Left before 1987    0.7016
   (0.4354)
  
 Left before 1993    0.8411
   (0.3656)
  
Number of observations    3235
   17
Table 2. Cox Hazard Estimates for Tenure on 1982 Job 
 
Years of schooling    -0.1087
   (0.0144)
    
Potential work experience in 1982  -0.0710
 (Age – years of schooling)    (0.0108)
    
1982 job tenure (in weeks: 1-52    0.0021
 weeks)    (0.0015)
    
1982 job tenure (in weeks: 52-    0.0038
 104 weeks)    (0.0009)
    
1982 job tenure (in weeks:more     -0.0029
 than 104 weeks)    (0.0011)
    
Union member in 1982    -0.2222
(0-1 dummy variable)    (0.0497)
    
Whether black    0.1675
(0-1 dummy variable)    (0.0502)
    
Used formal methods to find 1982  - 
 job   
  
Had help to find 1982 job from     
    (0-1 dummy variables):   
  
   Father (including in-law and    -0.3538
   step), grandfather, or uncle    (0.0711)
      
   Brothers, male cousins, or    -0.0961
   male friends    (0.0435)
    
  Female relatives or friends    -0.1304
   (0.0662)
  
    18
 
Table 2. Cox Hazard Estimates for Tenure on 1982 Job (cont.) 
 
    
AFQT score    -0.0015




N   3235
 
 
Also included in the analysis were dummy variables for whether married and for don’t 
know AFQT score.   19
Table 3. OLS Estimates for Selected Dependent Variables 
 
 
 Promotion 1982  Expected 
  Chances Ln 1987 Job Tenure 
Explanatory Variables  (1 to 4) Wages (in years) 
   
Ln 1982  Wage  0.3621 0.3495 1.0185 
 (0.0598) (0.0378) (0.3424) 
      
Years of schooling  0.0150 0.0415 0.0896 
 (0.0192) (0.0122) (0.0926) 
      
Potential work experience in 1982  -0.0188 -0.0102 0.1477 
 (Age – years of schooling)  (0.0136) (0.0085) (0.0684) 
      
1982 job tenure   -0.0003 0.0001 0.0106 
(in weeks)  (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0019) 
      
Union member in 1982  -0.0362 0.0833 0.8941 
(0-1 dummy variable)  (0.0582) (0.0336) (0.3231) 
      
Whether black  -0.0342 -0.0826 -0.0976 
(0-1 dummy variable)  (0.0604) (0.0318) (0.3128) 
      
Used formal methods to find 1982  -0.1346 -0.0317 -2.0132 
 Job  (0.0765) (0.0402) (0.4163) 
      
Had help to find job with 1982       
employer from:  (0-1 dummy       
   variables)       
      
   Father (including in-law and       
   step), grandfather, or uncle  -  -  - 
        
   20
 
Table 3. OLS Estimates for Selected Dependent Variables 
 
 Promotion 1982  Expected 
  Chances Ln 1987 Job Tenure 
Explanatory Variables  (1 to 4) Wages (in years) 
      
   Brothers, male cousins, or  -0.1827 -0.0826 -1.9287 
   male friends  (0.0798) (0.0406) (0.4270) 
      
  Female relatives or friends  -0.2415 -0.0968 -2.1816 
 (0.0979) (0.0535) (0.5318) 
      
AFQT score  -0.0016 0.0021 -0.0083 
 (Percentile rank)  (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0058) 
   
R
2 0.0344 0.2010 0.1293 
N 2947 2228 2315 
 
Also included in the analysis were a constant term, dummy variables for whether married 
and for don’t know AFQT score.  The number of observations in each row equals the 
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